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ABSTRACT
This paper systematically develops a set of general and supporting design
principles and specifications for a “Dynamic Emergency Response Management
Information System” (DERMIS) by identifying design premises resulting from the
use of the “Emergency Management Information System and Reference Index”
(EMISARI) and design concepts resulting from a comprehensive literature
review. Implicit in crises of varying scopes and proportions are communication
and information needs that can be addressed by today’s information and
communication technologies. However, what is required is organizing the
premises and concepts that can be mapped into a set of generic design principles
in turn providing a framework for the sensible development of flexible and
dynamic Emergency Response Information Systems.
A framework is presented for the system design and development that
addresses the communication and information needs of first responders as well
as the decision making needs of command and control personnel. The
∗

Primary Contact

Ken Peffers acted as senior editor for this paper.
Turoff, M., M. Chumer, B. Van de Walle, and X. Yao, “The Design of a Dynamic Emergency
Response Management Information System (DERMIS)”, The Journal of Information Technology Theory
and Application (JITTA), 5:4, 2004, 1-35.

Murray Turoff, Michael Chumer, Bartel Van de Walle, and Xiang Yao

framework also incorporates thinking about the value of insights and information
from communities of geographically dispersed experts and suggests how that
expertise can be brought to bear on crisis decision making. Historic experience
is used to suggest nine design premises. These premises are complemented by a
series of five design concepts based upon the review of pertinent and applicable
research. The result is a set of eight general design principles and three
supporting design considerations that are recommended to be woven into the
detailed specifications of a DERMIS. The resulting DERMIS design model
graphically indicates the heuristic taken by this paper and suggests that the
result will be an emergency response system flexible, robust, and dynamic
enough to support the communication and information needs of emergency and
crisis personnel on all levels. In addition it permits the development of dynamic
emergency response information systems with tailored flexibility to support and
be integrated across different sizes and types of organizations.
This paper provides guidelines for system analysts and designers, system
engineers, first responders, communities of experts, emergency command and
control personnel, and MIS/IT researchers.
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CONTRIBUTION
This is a normative paper in the specific application area of Emergency Response
Management Information Systems. It is written to reach three audiences:
•
•
•

Practitioners involved with the design of these systems.
Users and managers concerned with the development and use of these systems.
Researchers interested in doing further research in the area of emergency response
information systems.

It is a prime objective of this paper to trigger professional exchanges among the above
communities that will lead to a new generation of these systems.
The contributions of this paper are fivefold, it:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Draws together a very diverse literature on requirements in this area and attempts to
recover the important findings from some earlier literature and experiences in this field
that are largely forgotten today.
Develops a set of requirements for the design of Emergency Response Systems.
Presents a conceptual design based upon those requirements
Emphasizes the need for a single integrated enterprise type system that spans all the
functions of emergency response from planning, through execution and recovery, to
training.
Points out research opportunities associated with:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Smart System Requirements
Collaborative Knowledge Bases
Virtual Command and Control Centers
Personalization of information filtering
Interface design challenges for use of PDA’s in this environment
Simulation and gaming requirements and training opportunities

The real demonstration of the 9/11
event is the strategic and technical fallacy of
making the integration of communications
between incompatible systems (fire, police,
medical, etc.) dependent upon a single
physical command and control center. Such
centers are vulnerable to a planned act of
sabotage. If there is any strong technical
conclusion from the events of 9/11 it is the
requirement to develop an integrated
communications capability that can react as a
distributed virtual system with no required
need for the humans involved to be in a single
location (Smith and Hayne 1991). A virtual
command center can be created when the
authorities,
decision
and
reporting
responsibilities, the accountability tracking and
the oversight monitoring functions are
explicitly represented and present in the
supporting communications software for the
operation of such a human network. In fact,

those involved should be able to operate from
wherever they happen to be at the start of the
crisis: their home, office, or in transit. It is this
underlying technical goal assumption that is
one of the foundation goals of the
requirements discussed in this paper.
Our primary concern in this paper is
with the functionality requirements
that the software needs for those
planning and executing the emergency
response management function.
Very little has been published recently
on specific functional requirements for the first
responders to an emergency based situation.
We also note that a great deal of the literature
on emergency response prior to 9/11 focuses
on the response of commercial firms to
emergencies or crises largely restricted to the
corporate environment (Barton and Hardigree
1995; Braverman 2003; Kim 1998;
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Lukaszewski 1987; Massey 2001; Mork 2002;
Pearson, Misra, Clair, and Mitroff 1997;
Smart, Thompson, and Vertinsky 1978; Smart
and Vertinsky 1977 1984) or focused on the
public relations aspects of a crisis (Coombs
2000; Dyer 1995). When an organizational
emergency has macro-social effects and causes
potential or actual physical harm to people or
facilities, it usually leaves the jurisdiction of
the single organization and can evolve to be
the concern of local, state, and federal agencies
depending on the scope and nature of the
emergency (e.g. Bhopal, Three Mile Island,
Tylenol, and Exxon Valdez). However, there
are a number of significant observations that
apply to crisis situations regardless of the
organizations involved.
An important source for requirements
will be the past operation and extensive
experience of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness (OEP) which existed over 25
years until 1973 and was the only civil agency,
prior to the new Department of Homeland
Security, which could assume total control of a
crisis or disaster situation via executive order
of the president and execute the command and
control function over all other federal agencies
including the military. The remainder of this
paper first concentrates on the OEP experience
and examines other literature dealing with the
functionality to provide those managing a
crisis. It then further proceeds to develop a
conceptual design approach to an integrated

Dynamic Emergency Response Management
Information System (DERMIS). There is a
great deal of tacit knowledge gained from
experience in emergency response that should
influence the design of the functional
requirements for emergency response systems
Table 1 (Dermis Design Model) shows
the movement from Design Principles (Section
3) and Conceptual Design (Section 4) to
General Design Principles and Specifications
(Section
5)
and
Supporting
Design
Considerations and Specifications (Section 6).
An objective of this paper is to set forth some
of this wisdom and its resulting relationship to
design and to translate that wisdom into
feasible requirements relative to modern
technology.

2. HISTORICAL INSIGHTS ABOUT
EMISARI
In the days of OEP, one of the principal
resources was its large network of consultants
who were experts and specialists from industry
and academia. They were individuals who
could be called upon to help address issues and
problems in both planning for emergencies and
attempting to uncover vulnerabilities that were
not being adequately dealt with. They were
people familiar with critical industries such as
energy, communications, or commodities (gas,
oil, chlorine, ferroalloys, etc.).

Table 1 Dermis Design Model (Sections 3-6)
A. Design Premises
1. System Training and Simulation
2. Information Focus
3. Crisis Memory
4. Exceptions as Norms.
5. Scope and Nature of Crisis
6. Role Transferability
7. Information Validity and Timeliness
8. Free Exchange of Information
9. Coordination

C. General Design Principles and Specifications
1. System Directory
2. Information Source and Timeliness
3. Open Multi - Directional Communication
4. Content as Address
5. Up-to-date Information and Data
6. Link Relevant Information and Data
7. Authority, Responsibility, and Accountability
8. Psychological and Social Needs

B.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

D. Supporting Design Considerations and
Specifications
1. Resource Database and Community
Collaboration
2. Collective Memory
3. Online Communities of Experts
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Conceptual Design
Metaphors
Human Roles
Notifications
Context Visibility
Hypertext
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In 1970 a computerized Delphi system
(Turoff 1972) was prototyped and this
confirmed the ability of a group of 25 people
to engage in a collaborative Delphi process via
a computer network. The Delphi process
(Linstone and Turoff 1975) was the design of
paper and pencil based iterative structured
surveys to allow large groups of dispersed
experts (15 to 500) to exchange knowledge
and viewpoints about complex problems.
Today Delphi communication structures are
also carried out over the Web (Cho and Turoff
2003; Turoff and Hiltz 1995; Wang, Li,
Turoff, and Hiltz 2003). It was planned to
install that system as a mechanism to better
utilize the thousand or so professional
volunteer consultants associated with OEP. In
1971 OEP was given the responsibility for a
new emergency called a Wage Price Freeze.
This event prohibited all changes in prices and
wages including those that might have been
part of existing contracts for the duration of
the event. It fell upon OEP to monitor
nationwide
compliance,
examine,
and
determine requests for exemptions, and to
investigate and prosecute violations. The
Delphi system was modified in one week to
become
an
“Emergency
Management
Information System And Reference Index”
(EMISARI) for the Wage Price Freeze. The
name was chosen to convey to the hundreds of
people around the country involved a sense
that the system and OEP was providing them
what they needed.
There had been no existing plans in
OEP for a “wage price freeze” but since the
resulting EMISARI system was designed as a
communication system integrating people and
data into a single data base where all the
objects (people or data) could be dynamically
changed by non-technical administrators,
EMISARI became the only system that could
keep up with the evolution of the procedures
and processes governing the operation of the
Wage Price Freeze.
Designed as a
communication system (without explicit
content), there was nothing in the design that
related to the Wage Price Freeze or any other
crisis. As a result it was able to be used for
any type of crisis. The design focused on the
group communication process (Hiltz and
Turoff 1978, 1993; Lewin 1958; Ruben 1992;
Turoff 1993) and how humans gather,

contribute, and utilize data in a time urgent
manner.
EMISARI provided the dynamic ability
to tailor the people, objects, and the various
data, informational, discussion items, and
action items into whatever template was
deemed necessary and to modify that template
at any time. Such templates were assigned to
the members (contacts) of the system by a
system administrator who was a management
person without any technical training. About
one third of the software was devoted to
making it easy for an application professional
to act as modern switchboard operator by
creating templates and matching people to the
functions defined by the templates. The
existence of full text descriptions for even a
single data item allowed individuals to search
for what they needed by content descriptions.
Templates for data and other functions could
be created and assigned in a few moments by
the administrator.
Finally, the internal
markups let the users themselves tailor
dynamic reports on a given situation by
reconfiguring the current information in the
system. This was done by easily specified
Hypertext (Web like links) to any existing data
or text template. The reports with these links,
when retrieved, would always capture and
incorporate the latest updates of the defined
templates (Hiltz and Turoff 1978, 1993).
EMISARI was a highly structured group
communication process that followed basic
concepts of the Delphi Method (Linstone and
Turoff, 1975). It also provided an internal
computer conference capability and its own
internal message system that could be used in
a delayed or instant message mode (Turoff
1971, 1972).
EMISARI went on (in the Internal
Revenue Service, IRS, and the General
Services Administration, GSA) after 1973 to
be used over a fifteen-year period for
transportation strikes, coal strikes, petroleum
shortages, chlorine shortages, natural gas
shortages and some of the more severe natural
disasters (Macon and McKendree 1974, 1975;
McKendree 1977, 1978). The lore or tacit
knowledge accumulation that takes place in
organizations that go through a series of
disasters is not often explicitly captured by the
organization for reasons we will discuss later.
However, natural disasters are valuable events
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for developing organizational memories and as
"occasions for organizational sense-making”
(Weick 1993, 1995). EMISARI incorporated
many of the features called for today under the
current rubric of knowledge systems (Bieber et
al 2002).
EMISARI
allowed,
with
1970
technology, two to three hundred users
scattered around the country to exercise a
single coordinated group response to a crisis.
Over the years there has been an accumulated
literature on EMISARI (Hiltz and Turoff,
1978, 1993; Kupperman and Wilcox 1972;
Kupperman, Wilcox and Smith 1975; Price
1975; Renner, et al. 1972; Rice, 1987, 1990;
Turoff, 1971, 1972, 2002, Wilcox and
Kupperman 1972).

3. THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE
ATMOSPHERE OF OEP
The Office of Emergency Preparedness
(OEP) in the Executive Office of the President
grew out of the original OSS (Office of
Special Services) operation during World War
II. OEP was a single civilian agency that
could exert Command and Control over all
federal resources (including military) upon the
declaration of a Federal Emergency. In such
circumstances it could also exert regulation or
actions from companies involved in the
emergency situation. This occurred regularly
in such areas as transportation strikes,
commodity shortages, natural and unnatural
disasters. OEP had a mission to assess threats,
plan for the reaction to them, and to execute
those plans when needed.
It also had
responsibility to ensure that the government
could function effectively in whatever
emergency might occur. In practice it was a
single agency, at presidential level, where
emergency response problems on the part of
industry,
federal
government,
state
government, and local government could
receive attention and action.
In 1973 OEP was dissolved and the
various functions of OEP were, in some cases,
spread out to other government agencies
and/or eliminated from civil government. A
number of years later FEMA (Federal
Emergency Management Agency) was created
as a centralized body, but it has been restricted
largely to a reactive role with respect to federal
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disaster funds management and no significant
mission ability for threat assessment, response
planning on an integrated government wide
basis, and most importantly, overall command
and control in an emergency situation.
However, the concept of central authority does
not mean that those taking actions and making
decisions consistent with their responsibilities
have to be in one location or belong to one
organization. In emergencies, as in military
operations, the central authority delegates
decision making to those directly responding
to the situation.
One of the significant advantages the
OEP had was that in an actual crisis they could
draft any federal employee the agency felt it
needed to be part of the crisis response group.
This meant that for any situation the best
possible team could, in principle, be created.
Most often the process was one of quick
negotiation for the talent it needed and only
infrequently did OEP resort to ordering the
transfer.
There was a lot of lore and wisdom in
the operation of OEP and there were still some
senior civil servants and consultants from the
WWII OSS (Office of Special Services) days
who helped to set the tone and atmosphere of
the operations of that agency (Hiltz and Turoff
1978; Kupperman and Wilcox 1972).
With respect to information systems,
and in particular command and control
versions of those systems, we might try to
formulate the OEP philosophy in the following
set of premises.
Premise 1 - System Training and
Simulation: An emergency system that
is not used on a regular basis before an
emergency will never be of use in an
actual emergency.
It is not just a matter of training but of
finding actual day-to-day functions that
emergency systems can perform so that there
is no need for training in the use of the system
when the crisis occurs. Any sort of surprise
situation that requires a group to be created to
react to the circumstances would represent
such training opportunities.
While many
organizations do not like to admit to these
events, they seem to be quite frequent. The
only training otherwise possible is a quick

The Design of a Dynamic Emergency Response Management Information System (DERMIS)

apprenticeship by sitting at the side of
someone who already knows how to react in a
crisis and how to use the available facilities.
We created in the late sixties a very simple
multiple
choice
Computer
Assisted
Instructional (CAI) System which would
provide a scenario on a given situation and
present a set of alternative actions a person
could take in a disaster response situation.
There was always an “other” choice. Both
senior and junior staff at OEP could use it and
if they felt there were circumstances not
specified that would create a new alternative
valid answer, they could choose “other” and
explain the circumstances. This very simple
system allowed the responders to exchange the
experiences and knowledge they had acquired.
While in those days we considered it such a
simple communication addition to a CAI
system that we never published it, one can
consider it to day a basic collective memory
system. One could, for example, do the same
for sales personnel exchanging experiences.
Even in the same type of natural disaster the
specific circumstances in a similar situation
could differ considerably. Not everyone’s
experience was exactly like that of others in
even the same disaster.
There are actually many events in
commercial and governmental organizations
that qualify as “mini emergencies” such as
strikes, court cases, cost overruns, delivery
delay, accidents, new regulations, supply
shortage, natural disaster, budget shortfalls,
production delay, product or service
malfunction, contract negotiation, loss of key
employee, loss of key customer, designing or
responding to an request for proposal (RFP),
competitive actions, etc. All these sorts of
events can be “serviced on a regular basis” by
the concept of an emergency response system
we will be considering. In fact, it is a system
ideal for use by large dispersed and
asynchronous, i.e., virtual, project teams.
After the prior Northeast Blackout the
utilities in the Northeast created an emergency
dedicated phone system to aid in coordinating
activities to prevent another such occurrence.
In the Blackout of 2003 there was more than
an hour lag between the two major power-lines
going out in Ohio and the final 90 second
collapse in the New York area.
The
emergency phone system was not used till

after the final collapse throughout the
Northeast. One suspects it was a case of a
system not regularly used between disasters!
Furthermore,
an
existing
user
community is a critical aid during technology
diffusion (Rogers 1995) in facilitating the
introduction of new and unanticipated users
that will always occur within the actual crisis.
As a complex operation involving experts in
the required areas, the concept of "easy to use"
is replaced with "easy to learn" as the primary
design objective. Complex situations require a
matching complexity of variability in a system
designed to respond to such an environment.
Premise 2 - Information Focus: People
responding to an emergency are
working 14-18 hour days and have no
tolerance or time for things unrelated
to dealing with the crisis.
This has a significant impact on the
design of support systems and rethinking the
nature of filters, which attempt to prevent
information overload, and searching processes
for obtaining relevant information. No one on
the front line (physically or virtually) in a
crisis has time to read a newspaper, listen to
radio or TV, or take or return a phone call
without it being clear why they must do so.
When involved within an emergency situation
they must be able to get the full context
surrounding that situation as an integrated
process within the system they are using. It
also means that one cannot exactly predict
what they might be interested in ahead of time.
This also means that the individuals
carrying out the roles they are responsible for
in the system need to have access to all that is
taking place with respect to crisis and one
cannot assume that the flow of information can
be restricted which usually does occur in a
crisis response situation operating under the
“threat-rigidity” reaction hypothesis (Rice
1990). Under stress due to the lack of
necessary information or coordination
awareness people tend to rely on executing
action formulas that might be totally
inappropriate to the given situation. What may
be happening at a different location in the
crisis might have an impact on a person’s
decision about what actions to take.
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Premise 3 - Crisis Memory: Learning
and understanding what actually
happened before, during, and after the
crisis is extremely important for the
improvement of the response process.
Collecting
information
on
the
performance of people and systems in given
situations should be incorporated into the
design of the systems rather than as an
afterthought. The system needs to be designed
so that it can be evolved and improved from
the understanding provided by prior usage
(Keen 1980; Zuboff 1988). Also, capturing
the history of what took place without
imposing added load on the participants is a
critical part of the design objectives. This is
related to the next observation.
Premise 4 - Exceptions as Norms:
Almost everything in a crisis is an
exception to the norm.
There is no way to predict exactly who
is going to be doing what, when, why and/or
how at the command and control level in a
crisis environment. The crisis forces increased
decision making by those having to take
immediate actions on site. This authority is
granted from those above who expect
accountability in return so that they can carry
out oversight with respect to conflicts for
resources and other factors that need to be
integrated.
Problem solutions and the
reallocation of resources go on as a continuous
unpredictable process. When a paramedic
remains at a site rather than returning with the
ambulance it creates a limitation on the use of
that ambulance as a fully staffed medical unit
to be directed to other sites. What specific
data and information is of concern and interest
to a given individual is changing rapidly.
Exceptions to the planned response are
the critical factors in determining the minute to
minute operations. Anything that no one
thought of, but which occurs, in the response
for a given crisis situation becomes the critical
factor in generating problems to be dealt with
at all levels in the process. A crisis response
system is an information system that has to be
an integrated communication and data system
where the people involved, their talents,
concerns, immediate problems, actions taken,
actions planned, situation information, and
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consequences information are all part of the
underlying database and structure. One cannot
separate the data processes from the
communication processes or from the human
processes
symbiotic
to
“data”
and
“communication” processes.
This means the end user must be able to
reconfigure the system interaction in a
dynamic manner and designate changes in
priorities, filtering and delivery options at any
moment during the emergency response
process. It also means the system has to
dynamically observe these changes and keep
others who need to know about them up to
date.
Premise 5 - Scope and Nature of Crisis:
The critical problem of the moment is
the nature of the crisis, a primary
factor requiring people, authority, and
resources to be brought together at a
specific period of time for a specific
purpose.
The crisis response team is a real and
virtual community of specialists and experts
that must have unrestricted access to one
another and is able to act as a collective
(Hardeman, Pauwels, Palma, and Van de
Walle 1998; Weick 1993, 1995). For specific
problems, subgroups with the appropriate
talent and backgrounds need to be able to form
and function. The system also has to allow for
continuity and immediate substitution of
individuals when members are lost to the
process, forced to reposition their attention, or
when they are just plain exhausted. This also
speaks to the necessity of training people to
undertake multiple roles in a crisis situation
and having enough people who can be brought
in large scale or prolonged crisis situations
(Danowski and Swift 1985).
Premise 6 - Role Transferability: It is
impossible to predict who will
undertake what specific role in a crisis
situation. The actions and privileges of
the role need to be well defined in the
software of the system and people must
be trained for the possibility of
assuming multiple or changing roles.
Knowing who is available at the time of
action has to be determined and taken as a key
element of disaster response and the
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requirements for command and control.
Knowing what data relative to a problem is
current, what the source is, and what is its
degree of accuracy or status of the data is as
important as the data itself. Concepts such as
roles, responsibilities and the explicit status
variables of the data and roles (priority,
accuracy, source, actions, interests, concerns,
etc.) have to be part of the collaborative
database supporting the operation.
Premise 7 - Information Validity and
Timeliness:
Establishing
and
supporting confidence in a decision by
supplying the best possible up-to-date
information is critical to those whose
actions may risk lives and resources.
Emergency response systems must be
able to refine the data and information and
focus the sources of data on what is critical to
a decision. The system must allow for indirect
and implicit communication channels between
those dealing with interpretation and actions at
different levels in the operation. For example,
the OEP system, during the Wage Price
Freeze, would track the key words searched
but not found in various files such as the
policy interpretation file. The list of words
that those people in the field could not find
would be presented to the weekly meeting of
the policy committee examining requests for
interpretations and was used to influence the
agenda for the meeting. This is an example of
the
system
providing
an
indirect
communication channel between those in the
field and a policy setting committee. The
people in the field did not have to waste time
making explicit communications. Actions
taken are always going to be based upon
incomplete information and therefore every
effort must be made to obtain and direct the
information that is available into a common
shared database structure that may be
undergoing unpredictable change with respect
to the nature and structure of what is being
entered.
The extraction of cues from streams of
communications and data create indirect
communications useful as input for any
knowledge acquisition system (Hiltz and
Turoff 1978; Wieck 1995). In the emergency
situation there is a need for important policy
committees in the recovery phase and for

prolonged crisis situations which may result in
significant differences of view across multiple
agencies or government bodies. There can
also be a need for very quick reaction
committees at higher levels dealing with
reacting to possible resource shortages or the
integration of outside intelligence into the on
going crisis reaction activities.
Premise 8 - Free Exchange of
Information:
Crises involve the
necessity for many hundreds of
individuals from different organizations
to be able to freely exchange
information, delegate authority, and
conduct oversight, without the side
effect of information overload.
Consistency of response to all
stakeholders is considered a primary
requirement.
Problems in consistency of
response result from the “Niche-Width
Theory” (Massey 2001). An organization is
either a specialist or a generalist in the scope
of the environment and this reflects more
limited specific strategies or tactics for the
specialist organization. While a specialist
agency usually has more correct knowledge
about their area of expertise, the generalist
agency usually has more influence on policy
decisions. This can be applied to the many
organizations and agencies involved in a crisis.
A good example would be the FBI as a
generalist organization and the Centers for
Disease Control as more of a specialist agency.
The differences in response of these two
agencies during the Anthrax emergency are an
illustration of the coordination problem typical
in a crisis situation.
Each agency was
operating with different assumptions about the
real mission and the lack of quick resolution
by a clear authority led to mistakes, public
inconsistencies in policies, and undermined the
faith of the public in what the government was
doing. The Centers for Disease Control
wanted the public to have all the details on
what was happening for an objective of
inhibiting further spread of the disease and the
FBI did not want those carrying out the spread
of the disease to have some of the information
which might inhibit catching the culprits. The
problem about how to coordinate among the
many agencies involved in a crisis has been
expressed on numerous occasions in
statements to congress dealing with the
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formation of the new Homeland Security
agency. The challenge is expressed very well
by Hale (1997, p. 5 of 15):
…the key obstacle to effective crisis
response is the communication needed
to access relevant data or expertise and
to piece together an accurate
understandable picture of reality.
Faced with extreme uncertainty,
decision makers tend to increase their search
for information – often for symbolic purposes
and in self fulfilling ways – while
simultaneously shutting down some channels
of communication, and relying on familiar or
formal information and channels (Rice 1987).
Furthermore when information overload (Hiltz
and Turoff 1985) sets in, groups tend to restrict
their information processing and control
moves up the chain of command, leaving little
flexibility at the lower levels. High levels of
uncertainty and information overload are very
harmful to reliable disaster response.
Fortunately in most crisis situations we do not
have to worry about ambiguity as a data
corruption problem at the local and specific
event level of response.
At the higher
response level of oversight and resource
allocation considerable uncertainty and some
associated ambiguity can exist. However,
ambiguity results from the use of language and
the communications system which can be
minimized by the design of the system and the
training in its use.
As long as the responders are trained in
their role responsibilities and there is a history
of communication among a key nucleus of the
situation reporters and the decision making
responders there should be no significant
ambiguity problem.
Furthermore, if the
communication system is computer based we
have a better ability to put in quick learning
aids for those thrown into any situation with
out adequate training. If the system knows
who they are it can provide additional
feedback on what others will think what their
words, requests, and actions mean. The
system can also enforce apprenticeship by
assigning all communications for a “newbie”
to be monitored by a real time coach.
The deaths of many of the first
responders on 9/11 can be largely attributed to
this combination setting in as a result of lost
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communications. With out awareness of what
was happening, the lack of coordination due to
the loss of the physical command and control
center, and the overload from the immediate
stimulus of what was occurring around them,
many of the first responders were following
the rules they had been taught with out
reexamination. As a result, we had a tragic
example of the threat-rigidity hypothesis at
work.
Premise 9 – Coordination: The crux of
the coordination problem for large
crisis response groups is that the exact
actions and responsibilities of the
individuals cannot be pre-determined.
As we will see this is a result of the
uniqueness of each crisis situation, the
resulting need for improvising based upon that
uniqueness, the reliance on tacit information,
and the time-critical nature of the decision
process.
Furthermore, governments have certain
disadvantages over commercial firms when
responding to a crisis. They cannot easily hide
what is going on and this in turn results in four
factors unique to government agencies
(Horseley and Barker 2002).
1.
2.

3.
4.

Crisis raises questions about the
ineffectiveness of government.
Frequency of government (in-)action
during crises certainly does not imply that
government action is always functional or
beneficial.
Politics can turn crises from “occasions
for decisions” into “occasions for
restructuring of power relations.”
Military and civilian organizations called
upon in a crisis may show their Achilles’
heel during acutely critical situation, e.g.,
situations they did not expect or plan for.

In theory, government agencies are less
likely to get trapped in deceit, as corporations
do precisely because they can more easily
control and limit information.
New ways to deal with the unforeseen
events evolve with the nature of the crisis.
The person needing to make a decision must
be assured that anything relevant for the
decision can be found in a timely manner; but
also understand that precisely because it’s a
crisis, what might be considered the most
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“relevant” information may simply not exist.
People can deal with a high degree of
uncertainty, e.g., extract cues, to make timely
decisions as long as they know it does not
result from hidden information that will make
their actions appear wrong later. Providing
access to all available relevant information at
the lower levels is not always the attitude
within government organizations.

The extreme of coordination by plan is
complete external control of those in the front
lines, while the coordination of feedback
assumes internal control by those in the front
lines of a disaster situation. The nature of the
EMISARI system at OEP was the design of a
system dedicated to coordination by feedback
and it is this mode of operation that is also the
essence of the proposed design that follows.

In a crisis situation authority flows
down to where the action is. However, status
information and accountability data must
equally flow both upward and sideways. In
fact, it is also important that teams have
accountability as well (King 2002). With the
role carrying with it the authority for action
and the collection of roles making up a
momentary team for dealing with a particular
set of related events, we have team
accountability as well. This implies a great
deal about the functionality designed in an
emergency response system. It infers, for
example, that the data and actions in such a
system must clearly be identified by who is
supplying an idea, a plan, a viewpoint, data
and/or taking an action.

Refusing to recognize the reality of the
crisis situation, which is the movement of
authority to lower levels and the need for rapid
response, often results in the inadequate design
of a system that can handle the oversight
function in a timely and effective manner.
Because many serious decisions are
irreversible (Pauwels, Van de Walle,
Hardeman and Soudan 2000) this leads to
incorrect decisions that cannot be changed or
delays in making a decision which eliminates
the opportunity for the better alternatives to be
chosen.

The sixties and seventies saw
considerable academic effort to understand the
behavior of individuals and organizations in
crisis situations. An excellent report (Dynes
and Quarantell 1977) compiled much of this
research in to a single document. In their
summary they state the following (page 26):
On the basis of what has been described
here, the dominance of a normative
planning model which emphasizes
coordination by plan is, at best,
questionable.
The crisis event itself
creates the conditions where such
coordination is inappropriate.
This
inappropriateness, however, is not likely
to be challenged in post-disaster critiques
of organizational functioning which
utilizes coordination by feedback. The
increase in communication is usually
taken as a failure of coordination, not a
necessary condition for it. Emergency
planning, however, can also be directed
toward improving and facilitating
coordination by feedback, since it is likely
to be the dominant mode in emergency
conditions, not a chaotic aberration.

Taking the above as the assumptions
about the nature of a crisis it becomes clear
that an Emergency Response Information
System must be viewed as a structured group
communication system where the protocols
and communication structures are provided,
but there is little content about a particular
crisis except as an integrated electronic library
of external databases and information sources.
Others
have
agreed
that
Group
Communication via a computer may be the
most appropriate medium for a complex
problem requiring input from large numbers of
people (McKendree 1978; Price 1975).
A more recent examination of crisis
communications challenges highlights some of
the same properties (Horseley and Barker
2002):
•
•
•
•

•

Information overload is typical,
Heterogeneous groups and individuals
must coordinate their activities,
People must work together who do not do
so normally,
It cannot be accurately predicted who will
be available and involved at the time of
the crisis or at a given moment in the
response sequence, and
Community and public communication is
extremely important in dealing with many
crises.
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4. RESULTING REQUIREMENTS FOR
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND
CONCEPTUAL DESIGN SPECIFICS
The nine premises and their underlying
objectives and requirements discussed so far
cut across all types of crisis and emergency
situations. We need systems that make no
presumption as to whether one is dealing with
fires,
bombs,
hazardous
materials,
transportation interruptions, etc. It is the lack
of dependency upon specified content that
makes an emergency response system a
powerful tool to apply to any emergency once
the users have had the training and experience
to master it. There may be supporting data
bases that contain content information such as
the location and availability of specific
resources for specific types of crisis situations
or information and knowledge about such
things as hazardous materials. These database
resources could be anywhere, it is only
necessary that the local responders know about
them and how to be able to use them if needed.
However, the system that carries out the
response and allows the humans involved to
coordinate and exercise various levels of
command and control has to be a
communication system tailored for the
emergency response mission.
Fortunately
there are communication commonalities to the
coordination process in all disaster situations
which we can utilize to design the necessary
structuring.
Our primary concern is with the design
of an Emergency Response Management
Information System that will directly support
the responders in a local crisis situation and
the associated coordination structure among all
the involved parties and agencies. We also
assume the communications network and
computing technology exist to support a
reliable network of Personal computers,
servers, laptops, and PDA’s, mobile phones,
and wireless operations. We are focusing on
the supporting software and its required
functionality. The significant challenge that is
being confronted is to provide a functionality
that can be adapted for use on the limited
screens of PDA’s as well as the larger screens
of desktops and laptops. While it is desirable
and useful to consider multimodal interface
capabilities, such as the addition of voice input
12

and output (to free up hands for other tasks), it
will not explicitly be treated except that the
limited visualization capabilities of PDA’s
does make the addition of voice input and
output very critical as an alternative interaction
mode for anyone needing to use their hands for
their response activities (Pyush et al., 2002).
The ability to record the details of a situation
report may also require the ability to convey
useful emotional content to express such
things as seriousness, urgency, and conviction.
The ability to incorporate sound bites and
emotional icons into any text location and the
need for graphics and color is also an obvious
assumption.
The resulting foundation
requirements are:
•
•

•

•

•
•

•

Extremely easy to learn via training and
exercises because it is consistent with the
task requirements.
Useable by people who will have an
understanding of their roles and
responsibilities
in
an
emergency
environment.
Will focus on a concise and self-evident
design demanded by the small screen
orientation and the need to minimize
learning.
Will allow the individual users a high
degree of tailoring, filtering, and focusing
of the interface tailored to their specific
roles and responsibilities.
Will serve to support planning, evaluation,
training, exercises, and system updating
and maintenance between crisis events.
Will allow the operation of the response
function without the need for a single
operational physical center except for the
operation and backups for the computer
hardware and software acting as a server
and distributed resource databases for this
operation.
Will be designed as a structured
communication process independent of
the nature of a particular crisis.

To accomplish this we will focus on
five very specific criteria for the interface
design of a group communication system that
is extremely appropriate to the emergency
response environment: metaphors, roles,
notifications, context visibility, and hypertext.
1.

The metaphor or metaphors of a system
are the mental models of a system that a
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2.

3.

4.

5.

user can easily learn in order to create a
cognitive map that will make it easier to
understand the system. The metaphor
allows the user to translate the task
objectives into interface actions to carry
out those objectives.
The type of
metaphor that allows a human to create a
“road map” or model of an information
system is sometimes referred to as a
boundary object (Star 1989).
The concept of human roles built into the
software of group communication systems
(Turoff 1993) and supported by specific
privileges and tools for carrying out the
actions for those roles.
The concept of notifications, which are
relevant alerts to a user of changes in
status, data, and/or information of concern
to the given user, brought about by events
and/or the actions of other users (Turoff
1993).
The concept of context visibility, which
is the idea that the components of the
meaningful data objects are presented in a
context that relates to the understandings
of the user. By the user’s choice of a
particular data element the system can
infer the functions that that the user wants
to perform at that point in time. When the
user is uncertain as to what will be called
up or wants to vary the choice they need
to be able to obtain all the possible
selections as a submenu. This produces a
common sense object interface that makes
choices self evident and tailored to the
particular user.
The original concept of Hypertext
(Nelson 1965) which was the possibility
of multiple two way linkages with
semantic meanings that allowed a person
to utilize any item in the content of the
application as a set of menu alternatives to
move to other content or functionalities in
the interface.

By tying these five concepts together
we are able to hypothesize some very specific
requirements for the design of a self evident
Emergency
Response
Management
Information System.
4.1 Metaphors
In a foundation paper on metaphors
(Carroll and Thomas 1982) the concept was

expressed that metaphors were not only useful
for training users but that the “right” metaphor
could establish the criteria for the actual design
of the system, the interface, and its
requirements. There is no better illustration of
this concept than the emergency response
environment. One concept or data construct is
understood by all those who deal with crisis
management and response: the “event log” of
what took place during the crisis. It is the
primary concept usually used, after the crisis,
to analyze what took place (Hale 1997). Those
who have participated in a crisis and tried to
understand afterwards what actually occurred,
typically use some sort of log of events. The
event log is the foundation metaphor for our
design.
Instead of a log being a postmortem of
what occurs we can turn it into a dynamic
evolving record of what is happening as the
events of the emergency unfold.
Each
individual responder would have access to the
total log at various levels of summarization.
At the highest level would be only the root or
triggering events from the external
environment that cause reactions to cope with
the situation. Clicking on any one of them
opens the sub log of everything associated
with the collection of information about the
event and the resulting responses to the root
event as well as the associated resources
committed by recorded actions. Clicking on
any of the entities in the log will result in
obtaining all the relevant links from that item
to the various forms of associated information.
The log is the on going roadmap of the
emergency, which provides access to all the
associated trails being blazed by the resulting
actions. The user can quickly travel in any
direction that is of concern to them. A
responder would mark the events they need to
track in order to carry out their role and
responsibilities. Any resulting actions of a
marked event would be delivered to that user
in the future.
To accomplish this, the system needs to
allow the users to establish templates for an
integrated set of logs. A single root log by a
single individual can create over time, as a
result of future conditions, a whole sequence
of related event logs. A typical example of
root/parent log and its possible branch/children
logs are:
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Request resource root event log (location,
situation)
-

Allocate (or deny, delay, partial allocation
of) resource
Trigger a “maintenance of resource” as a
new root event
Resource in transit to destination
Arrival of resource at desired location
Status change in condition of resource
Status change in condition of situation
Recycle of current incident event for more
of the same
Resource reassigned before completion
Completion of original root event
transaction for this resource
Resource in transit to normal location

For example, the above sequence or log
template might be used for a medical unit,
which is typically composed of an ambulance,
a driver, a paramedic, and various supplies
along with a fuel supply. However, any given
unit might vary in the details (e.g., containing
a doctor). Furthermore, during the event the
paramedic or the doctor might remain on the
scene as the ambulance takes others back to
the hospital. A delayed response could occur
because the only ambulance available needs to
be refueled before it can start to satisfy the
original request.
During 9/11 there was no prior plan
that called for using a ferry to act as an
ambulance to deliver patients to the emergency
outdoor medical area set up in Jersey City.
Some event sets might have to be generic so
that the concept of something like a medical
unit can dynamically be redefined for a
particular resource request event. In this case
a new type of medical unit would have to be
established in the resource database during the
crisis. This nicely illustrates that particular
resource types might need to be established in
the database during the crisis. It is the
structure and process that comprise the
software and not the content. In this manner
the system can be adapted to any type of crisis.
The above template for a resource
request when started for a specific instance
would be time stamped and have the
information on the reason, situation, and
location that is the cause of the request entered
(to the extent information is available, and the
form should allow for multiple contributions to
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these, as different individuals in different
locations will have different reasons,
situations, etc.). Such information might be
updated as the request is in progress and all
updates would identify the human source and
the time of the update. There might be a large
set of resource requests sharing elements of the
basic situation information and at any time
details can be updated which in turn might
have impacts on the resource requests and their
adequacy. In addition, there needs to be the
ability for a new type of event template to be
created during the crisis situation.
Different people have as part of their
“role” the authority for launching a given
event type which may be a root or response
event in a template. This brings up the use of
a secondary but no less important metaphor,
that of the “checklist” (Hale 1997;
Lukaszewski 1987). Triggering an event
brings up a checklist for the person to fill in
the appropriate data and check off appropriate
choices; but always assuming free form inputs
for unexpected “other” unpredicted factors. It
would pinpoint the other roles that will be
needed and whether they are occupied at that
point in time, and display any other
conditional impediments that might have to be
considered such as the possibility of a delay
and the reason for it. If a medical unit cannot
be immediately dispatched it might cause the
people on the scene to take other or alternative
actions (e.g., dispatching some injured in other
vehicles).
The person creating an event must be
able to have the information that allows him or
her to conclude that the related events will be
able to proceed with reasonable dispatch. In
the original EMISARI system there was a code
to indicate that needed data was not yet
available which would substitute for the data
in the output field. Also with any such item
the information was also provided as to who
would be responsible for supplying and
updating that data item.
A typical mode of operation would be
for everyone to receive those root events for
the types, locations, and other conditions that
they are interested in, i.e., marking them
explicitly or having them linked to a marked
event. In addition only those events that the
user marks for tracking would result in the
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future delivery of other logs in the event
template when they occurred. In this manner
the crisis responder sets up their own filtering
mechanisms as events occur. Clearly the
person creating a root log event would
automatically be delivered all follow on log
items. There needs to be an override where
one person can determine if another has
marked an event for tracking and if not trigger
a resending of the event to the person who has
not been tracking it. This provides the
opportunity for oversight and alerting
individuals to items they may have
overlooked. The use of codes to designate
missing information allows users to search,
identify, and undertake efforts to obtain the
missing data.
The use of event log templates was
added to a derivative of the EMISARI system
(PREMIS) which was used to track the actions
with regard to violations of federal orders with
respect to numerous commodity shortages
declared as federal emergencies in the
seventies (McKendree 1978). That system
specified what actions the responsible party
could take for a given event/step in the
procedure and depending on the action notified
the appropriate role (person) that it was time to
take over responsibility for the given event.
The proposed concept of a crisis decision unit
(Smart and Vertinsky 1977) is a subset of the
concept of event templates for crisis situations.
Typical general event categories are:
triggering
events,
resource
requests,
information requests, situation reports,
completions, status changes, role changes,
warnings/alerts, and leads/speculations.
4.2 Roles
Roles have always been a key part of
any structured group communication process
(Turoff 1993; Turoff, Hiltz, Bieber,
Whitworth, and Fjermestad 2001). Roles were
a key concept in the original EMISARI crisis
management system (Hiltz and Turoff 1978;
Mckendree 1977, 1978). Any piece of data in
that system was always identified by who was
responsible for supplying it and updating it.
Who could launch what type of actions/events
was also very clearly displayed and available
for retrieval. A person’s entry in the directory
had a dynamic (time wise) list of any
responsibilities and was searchable by

responsibilities by every member of the
systems.
In a crisis it is never certain who will
take on which role or which combination of
roles. It is expected that people will be trained
to be qualified in a number of different roles.
While one recognizes that a policeman is
unlikely to take on the role of a fireman, when
it comes to roles of reporting, making requests
for resources and assigning resources we
would expect that cross training is in fact
feasible. At the time of a crisis the first
qualified person active in the system could
immediately take on the highest priority role or
roles they were pre-qualified for. In some
emergency situations individuals might be
pressed into roles they are not completely
qualified for if there is no one else available at
the moment. If this is a likely situation then
we need to worry about ambiguity, real-time
training, training aids, and more active
oversight requirements for monitoring in the
system design.
The persons with the authority to assign
roles could assign roles to any active member
of the system based upon what was needed at
that time. Experience has shown that as a
minimum, there are eleven fundamental roles
that can take place in a large scale crisis
situation. Each role should be supported by
functionality built into the software (Turoff,
Hiltz, Bahgat, and Rana 1993). The roles
specific to the emergency response function
are:
Fundamental Roles
1.

Request resources: people: medical,
police, fire, military, construction,
utilities, etc.; things: medical units,
transport, fuel, equipment, etc.
2. Allocate, delay, or deny resources
3. Report and update situation
4. Analyze situation
5. Edit, organize, and summarize
information
6. Maintain resources (logistics)
7. Acquire more or new resources
8. Oversight review, consult, advise
9. Alert all with a need to know
10. Assign roles and responsibilities when
needed
11. Coordinate among different resource areas
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12. Priority and strategy setting (e.g.,
command and control)
In any crisis there are requests for
resources; other people must decide if the
request can immediately be satisfied or has to
be denied or delayed. There is also a need to
report the situation at different locations, for
different dimensions (medical, fire, police,
etc.), and for others to analyze the incoming
information to determine the implications for
those:
•
•
•

Allocating resources,
Maintaining current resources, and
Acquiring additional resources to meet an
expected demand.

In addition we have, in many situations,
the need to position resources, obtain
specialized knowledge, e.g., hazardous
materials, or to raise or lower the level of the
current response to the crisis. In the original
EMISARI system one could dynamically
establish report forms, including quantitative
and qualitative inputs and assign them to
people responsible for reporting the situation.
Events and roles have an intimate
relationship. Event types should be open
ended and the user community should be able
to define specific event types and their
relationships. The following is a possible
general classification of event types.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Triggering Events: cause the need for
action or response of some sort
Resource Requests: requesting the
assignment of any type of resource
including people or equipment
Information Requests: expressing the
need for more information
Situation Reports: descriptions of a
current situation at any level of detail or
scope
Completion Event: the termination of or
conclusion of a chain of events
Status Changes: a significant change of
status of a particular event chain
Warnings/Alerts: something that needs to
be watched for or investigated
Leads/Speculations: an issue, concern, or
possible happening that needs to be
considered in the current situation
Role Changes: a change in who is
responsible for a specific role either

•
•
•
•

temporary or permanent
Finished events: event process completed
Interrupted events: a pause in the process
of treating the event
Suspended events: a pause with no
expectation of a startup
Archived events: Event retired from any
dynamic modification (frozen)

The above categories apply to all
events. Orthogonal to the above event types is
a classification for events specific to a given
role which has a responsibility for a given
event that has the following possible
categories:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

New/waiting: events the user has not seen
or dealt with yet
Event task tracking: an event the role is
now responsible for handling
Event monitoring: events of interested
being tracked
Action required: a task for which an
action must be taken by this role
Response required: need for this role to
supply information
Priority change: a priority change in an
item the role is handling
Status change: a status change in an item
the role is handling
Information request: to this role
Finished events: no need for further
tracking, process completed for this role
Interrupted events: a pause in the process
of treating the event for this role
Suspended events: a pause with no
expectation of a startup for this role

The above results in a two dimensional
selection table for a user in a role which shows
the number of events in each category and
allows the user to obtain a list of the set of
events by clicking on the count in that
category. The categories should be extensible
by the user community.
Usually, people deal with medical, fire
fighting, law enforcement, military, utilities,
and construction resources so that many of
these fundamental roles are multiplied by the
types of specific resources being considered.
This means coordinators must take the
responsibility to ensure responses from these
multiple resources are not interfering with one
another. Typically today the response systems
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for these different areas are separate and the
details of what is going on with any one of
them is not available to all that are involved.
In World War II, the army and Navy decoded
the Japanese transmissions on alternative days
and prepared summaries for the leadership.
Too late it was discovered that if the analysts
had had access to the total file the likelihood of
an attack on Pearl Harbor would have been
much more obvious.
In terms of our metaphor of the use of a
dynamic log, privileges are associated with
each role which in turn authorizes, for
example:
•
•
•
•
•

Creating Event log entries of a given type.
Responding to specific types of event log
entries.
Supplying information or data related to
specific events.
Producing situational and interpretive
reports related to sets of events.
Providing modification privileges over
material entered by others.

In general, one can define about 50
primitive digital communication privileges
including such things as allowing some one to
set links in other people’s material or a person
inserting material in files he or she cannot read
(Turoff 1993).
The role is an explicit object in the
database that has specific links to all the other
data objects in the system and those links carry
privileges for actions on the data in the system
(Turoff 1993). Nevertheless, in the actual
emergency it will be a human who takes on the
role and carries out all the activities consistent
with the privileges associated with the role.
This was true in the first group communication
system (Turoff 1972) for carrying out Delphi
Exercises and in EMISARI. Roles can be
aided by computer agents and they can be
recorded and canned for use in specific
training scenario simulation games. However,
it is doubtful that one would ever want to
assign any decision responsibility to any such
agents in real emergency situations.
4.3 Notifications
The critical general property of
computer-based communications that we are
utilizing in designing a group communication
system for crisis response is that only by using

a computer can the content of the information
being communicated also be the “address” for
delivery (Hiltz and Turoff 1978; Turoff 1993,
Turoff, et. al. 2001). People in a crisis have to
focus on information needed and the currency
of the situation factors that relate to the
decisions and actions they are taking. Since
what they need to know is very dependent
upon the actions and knowledge of others, we
need to notify the user of the impact of those
particular items that relate to their roles,
actions, responsibilities, and what they have
decided to track in terms of current events in
the system. By having the users and their
dynamic properties as an integral part of the
data structure of the system, the computer can
determine who should be sent what
notifications.
Any other unstructured
alternative like email would quickly lead to
information overload (Hiltz and Turoff 1985).
Given the unpredictable nature of a crisis and
its reliance on tacit (unique) knowledge
(Hayek 1945) being generated by the situation,
one cannot develop or use algorithmic rules for
the delivery of information. The system must
allow the users to self-organize the
information by their actions. Tacit knowledge
can be acquired only through experience such
as observation, imitation, and practice (Kim
1998).
As an example, the current number of
ambulances that have been assigned and could
be assigned is a dynamic variable resulting
from events requesting the use of ambulances
and the consumption of resources needed to
maintain the ambulances. At some point there
is a need for a notification to one or more
individuals that such a resource will run out at
a certain time based upon both usage rate and
the expectations of additional causalities due
to further possible damage. Someone has to
seek an additional assignment of ambulances
or vehicles that can serve this function to the
resource pool and determine where they
should be positioned. Another example of
tacit knowledge is the assignment of roles, for
example, knowing who would be the best
reporter for a given situation at a given time in
the crisis. In essence, when the information is
not complete and not expected to be, the
decisions will be utilizing the tacit knowledge
or the intuition of the decision makers.
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Depending on the nature and extent of
the crisis, resources will start to run out and a
very dynamic inventory function is needed just
to alert the responders to projected
consumptions of resources. A human must
determine when an action must be taken. The
local road conditions, extent of the crisis and
numerous other factors make automatic
assignment impossible. Even if the supply of
ambulances is running out, only a human can
decide if the depletion rate and the demand
rate in a given crisis situation will require resupply.

capture those short messages that are likely to
be repetitive in any crisis and allow people, as
a result, to communicate with an absolute
minimum of input operations by utilizing
preformatted communication items.

Another critical type of notification is
the “canned notification” (Turoff 1993) which
also has roots in automated command and
control systems in the military. There are a
number of distinct types, including response
check-off and fill-in.

A log event entry has associated with it
the categories of information it is concerned
with such as:

The response checkoff type of
notification is where someone indicates they
want to respond to a particular item and
obtains a list of alternatives from which they
can choose a response that will become linked
to the original item and be received by any one
who received the original item. Examples are:
-

I agree/disagree with it
I am taking care of this
Delay this action
Give this higher/lower priority

Since the notifications are standardized
and are linked to the item they are referencing
receiver ambiguity should be minimized. The
creation and sending of the notification takes
only a few clicks.
The fill in type is where the receiver
can fill in a specific item of quantitative or
qualitative data with the notification
-

Need info on (subject)? (data, e.g. number
of injured)
Will have more info by (time)
We will need (number) more (supply
item)
What is your best estimate of the injured?
(number)

The specific wording of any type of
notification is not important since the system
should be designed so the local user population
can define and change it at any time as an
evolving process. What is important is to
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Notifications also serve as a retrieval
handle in that any click on this notification
will bring up the details about the item it is
referring to. This leads us to the concept of
“context visibility” that is critical to the
success of the system.
4.4 Context Visibility

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Log identification
Resource type(s)
Author and/or responsible party
Relevant location
Relevant circumstances
Next expected event or events and role
responsibility for action
Status (associated events in the root log
sequence)
Allowed or generated lateral logs (new
root event logs)
Allowed or generated notifications
Footnotes or other linkages

An
event
generating
specific
maintenance or re-supply of existing medical
units or an event to acquire more medical units
should be linked to any medical unit requests
that have not yet been serviced.
The elements that are attached to a log
can act as the menu choices for the users to
find out more information about the particular
item in the log. For example, clicking on an
item in the log brings up various information
about the item, as suggested in Table 2.
Words and abbreviations in the specific
context of an event log are used in much the
same way as an icon is used to launch
functions in an interface. The advantage over
icons is the much larger vocabulary of choice
that the use of semantic memory (see
Collective Memory section 6.2) allows us.
This concept is an extension of context
sensitive help function (i.e., Apple’s Balloon
help) in interface design applied to the primary
interaction as opposed to only the help
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function – similar to Web mouse-overs, or
pop-up comments on MTV videos!
The design capitalizes on episodic
memory (see Collective Memory section 6.2)
to allow people to track cognitively what is
taking place in time and the semantic memory
to bring up the needed data or information to
take required actions. The role of the person
determines what root events he or she will
receive and there will be a function which
allows the user to indicate if that particular log
is one that they wish to follow or track with
respect to the log items this event will trigger
as children or peers. This method of self
filtering was first used in the TOPIC System
(Turoff, Hiltz, Bahgat, Rana 1993) on
Electronic Information Exchange System
(EIES) in the late 70’s for hundreds of people
to exchange information as a single group
communication process structure. In that
system any one can send short requests for
information but only if the user “marks” the
question, as one marks an email message, do
they get the replies.

4.5 Hypertext
The concept of Hypertext is far more
general than the current operation of the Web
which, unfortunately, most people assume, is
Hypertext. For the crisis management function
one must go back to the originally conceived
properties of Hypertext (Nelson 1965) which
included:
•

•
•
•

•

All links are two way in that they have
anchors at both ends so that if one goes to
a location indicated by a link he or she can
always trace that link back.
Links are typed semantically in that they
have a specific meaning.
One can have many links issuing from an
anchor point, each with its own semantic
meaning.
The collection of the current links from an
anchor point becomes a context sensitive
dynamic
menu
providing
context
visibility.
Links are dynamic and can automatically
change at any time as a result of collective
events and actions by the users..

Table 2. Alternative Object Links (Hypertext Relationships)
Context item
Log ID
Resource Type

Author or responsible party
Circumstances
Location
Status
Linkages
Expected events
Footnotes

Retrieved possibilities
All event logs which are children of this one
The parent or root event log
Lateral generated “brother/sister” event logs
Current status of this particular unit
Status of all unused units
Status of all units at location
Status of all in use units
Status of all units
Sources of new units
Current responsibilities and status
Backup individuals
Expected time for completion of action for this log or notification item
All associated status and qualitative information required for this event
A map or diagram of location area and what is there as well as it is known
about what is there.
A text / table list of what is there
List of completed events in this sequence
List of incomplete events in this sequence
All events in this sequence
Notifications linked to this particular event
Notifications linked to this sequence of events
Updates and reports relevant to this event
Who is to act on which events as a result of this one
Any footnotes of added explanations by anyone concerned with this event
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None of the above is yet available as
standard Web features. Nelson (1965), in his
early work on Hypertext, pointed out that links
can have dimensional ordering. A link from
something like a medical unit within an event
log entry can vary by the degree of generality
or specificity. The specificity extreme would
produce the details of a specific medical unit.
At the generality extreme it could be a report
on the status of all the medical units involved
in the crisis. One of the many intermediate
links could be the status of all the medical
units in the given location this particular unit is
headed towards.
Whenever a user creates a link they can
either indicate they want the most likely link
they need or they can request a menu of the
possible links from that anchor point. The
overall integration of metaphors, event logs
and check lists, and semantic typing of links
leads to the design of a self evident user
interface (Balasubramanian and Turoff 1995)
and allows lateral or divergent connections to
be made mentally without information
overload setting in (Hiltz and Turoff 1985).
Coupling the two concepts of
contextual visibility and hypertext creates a
powerful integration factor for all the aspects
of a crisis response system. In essence, the
choices provided to the users are dynamically
adjusted to the status of the crisis and the
events that have been logged. A typical
application that has some of these features are
some electronic calendars where clicking on
the entry or some subject of the entry retrieves
further details about what is scheduled? Today
the effort to evolve the Web along these lines
has appeared under the new term of the
“Semantic Web” (Berners-Lee, Hendler, and
Lassila, 2001).
Supporting all the above should be a
highly flexible and powerful list processing
interaction capability, which can be tailored by
each user, each role, and each screen type.
The same functionality for list processing
should be applied to all types of lists generated
by the system. It should allow the user to
manipulate lists and to refine lists by
establishing various filtering, organizing, and
categorizing rules that can be applied for the
benefit of the user. The preferences indicated
for a user would be a function of the role and
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of their problem solving style. A general list
processing foundation applicable to and
consistent with any list on the system is the
key to allowing users to reduce information
overload. Lists will be very dynamic as there
can be changes occurring to a list by others
while a person is utilizing it.

5. GENERALIZED DESIGN PRINCIPLES
There are certain general design
principles that should be applied to any
emergency response system:
Design Principle 1 - System Directory:
The system directory should provide a
hierarchical structure for all the data
and information currently in the system
and provide a complete text search to
all or selected subsets of the material.
A possible structure for the system we
have been describing is:
Directory
- People
- Background and Expertise
- Group Memberships
- Conference Memberships
- Bulletin Board Editorships
- Roles
- Responsibilities
- Log Event Creation Privileges
- Current active log events
- Completed log events
- Notifications
- Resource Concerns
- Authorities
- Roles
- Events
- Groups (e.g. medical, firefighters,
volunteers, etc.)
- Conferences (topic discussions)
- Bulletin boards (Policies, Plans, etc.)
- Databases (resources, information, local,
national, etc.)
- Learning materials and scenario game
generators
- Other Emergency Systems
Clearly there needs to be a way to form
specialized groups that are focused around
certain areas of concern and to have supporting
group conferences and message lists for these
groups. Bulletin Boards represent the semistatic material that a small group of people is
responsible for updating.
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There is a lot of opportunity in this
system for smart software to aid the members
of the system:
•
•
•

Letting individuals know who is the
subgroup concerned at some point in time
with the same situation.
Finding information that a given
individual is not aware of but should be.
Helping the user to adapt their linkage
filters to meet a changing situation and
requirements.

The long term success of the system is
clearly dependent on features like “smartness”
being evolved as part of an on going
development process with feedback from real
users and real applications (Gervasio and Iba
1997; Iba and Gervasio 1999; Van de Walle
2003).
Design Principle 2 - Information Source
and Timeliness: In an emergency it is
critical that every bit of quantitative or
qualitative data brought into the system
dealing with the ongoing emergency be
identified by its human or database
source, by its time of occurrence, and
by its status. Also, where appropriate,
by its location and by links to whatever
it is referring to that already exists
within the system.
This type of system cannot be an
anonymous database: there are many situations
where the source of the data is important, and
that person will need to be contacted. For
example, there are resources that will be
allocated many times during the course of the
emergency and it can be necessary to request
an update on the expected release of a resource
before it is actually released for reassignment
in order to determine if a similar resource that
might take longer to accomplish the task is to
be committed. Status reports, that indicate
why something is not going as expected
(exception reports) and why expected data is
not there yet, should also be included. When
information is incomplete knowing the data
source allows others to make contact with the
human source or reporter when there is a need
to get more complete information. The person
who made the early report may not have had
time to provide additional updates and might
not be aware there is an urgent need for
updates that might be available.

A person preparing a report on some
aspect of what is taking place should be able to
link data or other comments into their report so
that the report, when viewed, reproduces the
material that is linked and shows the latest data
entered which may have occurred after the
initial report was prepared. Also anyone in the
system should be able to link footnotes to any
item in order to make clear any relevant
factors they have obtained about that item.
This also serves to allow a discussion thread to
develop around a particular data item. As a
result it quickly becomes clear who the
persons are in the system concerned with a
particular situation represented by the data
item.
Design Principle 3 - Open Multi Directional Communication: A system
such as this must be viewed as an open
and flat communication process among
all those involved in reacting to the
disaster.
There is no way to predict what
information is going to be needed and who is
going to need it. In fact, people often have to
change roles in the course of the emergency
and carry out processes they were not
originally scheduled to be responsible for. An
emergency can continue for many days and
some roles may have to be shifted to different
individuals at different times due to the finite
capacity of individuals and the concept of
individual “diminishing returns.” In addition
the reduction of what is normally a
hierarchical
organization
to
a
flat
communication network and the resulting
change in individual status has been observed
in many crisis situations (Dynes and
Quarantell 1977). Associated with this is the
increase in the number of decisions made at
lower levels by those involved in the crisis.
Design Principle 4 - Content as
Address: the content of a piece of
information is what determines the
address
This is, of course, one way in which a
computer system adds a different dimension to
data and information that is difficult to
duplicate with other forms of communication
(Hiltz and Turoff 1978; Turoff 1993).
Individuals involved in the emergency, in
addition to sending and receiving information
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from other people, are inputting and retrieving
information determined by its content. A
robust directory structure provides a
comprehensive searchable space for people to
find what they need and to create their own
filters and links accordingly. When people
mark an event or data as being of interest or
importance, it allows them to develop and
organize just the material of interest to them.
By adding the very simple feature of allowing
crisis personnel to retrieve a list of all people
who have marked a particular item as being
important and then using that list as a
communication
address, subgroups of
“common concern” can be formed in a very
dynamic manner. The formation and nature of
such ad hoc groups is difficult to predict or
plan. It can be particularly valuable for those
having analysis or reporting roles in the crisis.
Design Principle 5 - Up-to-Date
Information and Data: Data that
reaches a user and/or his/her interface
device must be updated whenever it is
viewed on the screen or presented
verbally to the user.
This is a form of what might be termed
"dynamic" linking in that all data exists as a
master copy located somewhere in the system
which also tracks where in the network of
users it also resides. When a user has data in a
viewable state the master copy knows this is
occurring and anytime there is a change, that
change is transmitted to the place where it is
being displayed. This means the user can be
assured that the status of resources he or she
needs is always current. For example, a
certain number a user is viewing can change
while it is being watched. For events that have
been marked by an individual for tracking, a
change notification with respect to the original
marked event status, information, or new subevent would be put on the user’s queue for
viewing. The user does not have time to
search for an event of concern and a change of
status in an event of concern should just be
delivered and presented.
It might well
necessitate levels of marking to allow the user
to control the amount of delivered material by
indicating what events should result in
interruptions to the user rather than just being
queued.
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Design Principle 6 - Link Relevant
Information and Data: An item of data
and its semantic links to other data are
treated as one unit of information that
is simultaneously created or updated.
The concept of linking data is critical to
the emergency response operation. Any single
item of data is associated with numerous
attributes and other pieces of data. The user
cannot spend the time to contemplate and
devise complex search queries. Therefore a
single item of data must have associated with
it all the links that express its relationship to
other data. Furthermore, these links will have
different meanings (link types) and will be
two-way links (unlike the current Web).
When a piece of data is created or updated all
related links will also be brought into existence
or updated. If a person has moved through a
series of links to arrive at some final data of
interest it is insufficient to merely give them
the “back” button to move back up in the same
sequence. There may have been a choice to
branch that they now know they should have
taken to examine other data as well. Therefore
the system should be able to provide the
alternative links they could have taken and
allow them to “go” directly to what they now
want.
Design Principle 7 - Authority,
Responsibility, and Accountability:
Authority in an emergency flows down
to where the actions are taking place.
This just reinforces the need for
everything to be available to those on the
scene of an event. Those who are in a remote
“command center” are there to ensure that the
individual decisions being made in the front
lines are not resulting in some negative
cumulative result that has to be corrected. The
upper chain of command in an emergency
operation is an oversight and exception
operation with respect to localized actions.
They need to be aware of when an action taken
appears to be wrong because it is inconsistent
or in conflict with other actions elsewhere.
Authority for action has to exist with the front
line roles, and higher levels should largely deal
with
monitoring,
oversight,
resource
availability, and threat assessment. Decisions
become the launching of an event that is a
request for an action to take place. While
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there are those empowered to halt an action
because of a possible conflict or difficulty, the
action will take place unless someone with
oversight authority halts it while it is in
progress. There has to be clear accountability
of who is taking what actions and it should
also be clear to all involved when a conflict
occurs and how it is being handled. In disaster
situations authority is always flowing
downward (Dynes and Qarantell 1977).
Design Principle 8 – Psychological and
sociological factors: Encourage and
support the psychological and social
needs of the crisis response team.
It is necessary that social relationships
be allowed to flourish and that the system can
be utilized for the maintenance and
development of those relationships. This has
positive impacts on reducing stress levels and
facilitating the handover of roles and dealing
with oversight. The system must allow for a
“team spirit” to develop. People must get to
know one another well enough so that they
have no qualms about handing over their role
to another person. They must develop a
feeling of trust in the others and have a good
understanding of each other’s abilities.
Knowing what can be asked of an individual in
their fourteenth hour on a shift as compared to
their first hour can be an important factor.
Facilities like tracking the time on station for
each user become significant.
As more and more people are included
who are external to the everyday
organizational teams, the ability to accomplish
social networking through “coffee break”
conferences and chat rooms in order to
develop quick trust is increasingly important.
The encouragement of informal language in
communications as opposed to only the use of
rigid fill in forms with no open text
commentaries allowed is also a design factor.
No one would think of forbidding socializing
in face to face groups but somehow it is still
left out of the design considerations of the
typical information systems environment.
When an emergency system is employed as a
dispersed virtual command center, this
consideration becomes critical. There is a
strong need to be able to rely on one another
and to accept frankness in viewpoints as the
common norm. This can only happen in a

social network.
The most challenging aspect of the
interface design in this regard is the reduction
of information overload and allowing the user
to view the system as a helper that does not
constrain the user to a single approach to
problem solving. The user should be able to
adapt the system to his or her method of
cognitive problem solving and not impose one
rigid approach for all the users. Rigidity in the
interface is what will inhibit creativity or
improvisation in unique problem situations.
People in a crisis environment can operate
under stress given the morale associated with
the mission they are engaged in; however,
when their tools do not match the performance
levels they are seeking to obtain, this allows
the “rigidity threat syndrome” to set in. This
area of interface design is still a basic
challenge for the state of the art.

6. SUPPORTING DESIGN
CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of general
requirements and supporting functionality and
systems that are necessary for creating a
comprehensive
Emergency
Response
Management Information Systems
6.1 Resource Databases and Community
Collaboration
A critical component of any emergency
response system is a resource database. This
might be a collection of databases providing
different types of physical, informational, or
human resources. Some national databases
that exist in such areas as hazardous materials
can provide timely information and clearly
would be referenced in any local database.
However, the key components of what needs
to be in the local database span a very wide
range of areas in order to be useful to any of
the various types of disaster situations that
might be encountered. For example:
•
•
•

Any type of construction equipment that
might be useful in a disaster situation and
the people who can operate it.
Medical facilities and medical personnel
including retired volunteers
Professionals with knowledge relevant to
such things as hazardous materials, water
treatment, building integrity, road repair,
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•
•
•
•

explosive handling.
Boats and any sort of possible transporting
vehicles and trucks.
Materials
testing
equipment,
e.g.
biological, chemical, etc.
Utilities: maintenance units and people.
Hazardous material information

The design of a database to
accommodate a very diverse set of possible
resources is not difficult today. However, if a
local government agency has to pay to
maintain and update the data to make sure it is
current we then create a very expensive
operation (Eichenbaum 2002). The only way a
resource database can be maintained by a
typical local community or regional area is if
the database is designed to be collaborative in
nature.
The people and organizations that have
resources that could be borrowed, rented,
commandeered (with compensation), or
volunteered in an emergency situation need to
be able to enter and maintain the data they are
responsible for and should be able to use the
database for their own purposes. The database
has to be set up as a community resource. A
contractor having an inventory of equipment
that might be useful would maintain that entry
via online access to the database. It could also
be that various organizations might like to be
able to find certain resources in a nonemergency situation and such a database can
service the potential sharing, exchanging, or
renting of resources in the community. In
September 11, 2001 there was a rush of
contributions by industry (Michaels 2001) and
this means it is possible to get community
involvement if approached correctly. In many
local areas subject to reoccurring natural
disasters this has always occurred.
The maintenance of this database
becomes
a
collaborative
dispersed
responsibility among the members of the
community in a specific area. Each person
supplying possible resources would have direct
access to updating their supplied data. In
addition, one would hope government
organizations like state agencies, the National
Guard, and military units in the area would be
significant contributors to such a collaborative
resource database. Clearly, on a regional
basis, local communities would be able to
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access each other’s community databases for
resources that they might not have, or to deal
with large scale disaster situations or extreme
events.
A successful example of a
collaborative dispersed database system is an
inter-library loan system.
A resource data base should be
geographically-oriented and should integrate
with all the data on utilities, buildings, and
roads. New York City was quite fortunate that
it had such a data base in existence located in
Brooklyn instead of the downtown office of
the agency responsible for it. It was invaluable
in aiding the recovery actions and planning for
the city’s recovery (Eichenbaum 2002;
Thomas, Cutter, Hodgon, Gutekunst, and
Jones 2002). Such a database would also be
invaluable as an aid in dealing with a
spreading crisis such as a hazardous gas cloud.
For organizations dealing with a crisis,
the prior involvement of the public in the
planning is considered a valuable asset once an
actual crisis occurs (Dyer 1995). This has
been demonstrated in numerous natural
disaster situations where public cooperation
inhibits numerous possible complications and
provides added manpower during the response
phase. Once people are involved in the
planning they will also be willing to participate
in exercises to evaluate the plan. Given the
lack of local and community resources in most
smaller urban areas it becomes almost
mandatory to try and incorporate community
involvement in the crisis response planning
and execution activity.
6.2 Collective Memory
Semantic memory or abstract memory
provides rules about events, their interactions
and dependencies, and how they relate to
objects or data groupings. Collective memory
evolves from these generalities of cases
making up the description of the real world.
There is the process of dynamic association
between the descriptive events taking place
and the prescriptive responses to them. The
event log metaphor allows this to occur in a
flexible but unambiguous manner that results
in a cognitive approach to a collective memory
(Warren 1996).
Much work on collective memory and
collective learning has been independent of
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our understanding of cognitive psychology and
sometimes too focused on organizational
context. However, it stands to reason that if
we can associate the properties of a collective
memory with those of cognition, the resulting
systems may be much more intuitive to the
individual members of the group. This will
allow more of the cognitive capacities of the
individuals to be focused on the collective
emergency response task. Beginning with the
merger of episodic (events) memory and
semantic (typed linkages) memory and adding
the ability of groups to form around content of
“common concern” through their marking and
action patterns, we have provided the
possibility of forming a very dynamic
collective memory.
Event logs may be extremely helpful in
tracking the course of a crisis and establishing
an organizational memory (Hale 1997). Hale
further suggested they could be listed on flip
charts in the control center! This lack of
comprehension as to what we can do with the
technology seems to be rather common in local
and regional emergency efforts. Much of the
current emergency efforts focus on telephone,
radio, and face to face verbal communication
technology.
In 9/11 the emergency
responders,
after
the
loss
of
the
communications center and their verbal
devices, were supplied with text based pagers
and these are reported to have worked very
well (Michaels 2001). There is a considerable
understanding today of the factors that
influence adoption of new digital media (Rice
2002) and sensible management policies based
upon those understandings can easily bring
about rapid diffusion of such technology.
It is often difficult to codify and
communicate knowledge that is only
applicable to very specific situations and that
is why scenarios are very appropriate for
expressing tacit knowledge (Kim 1998). Not
everyone has had the same experience with
respect to a crisis situation since the events are
relatively rare (King 2002). Even “natural”
crisis events such as hurricanes, tornados, or
earthquakes produce very unpredictable
specific impacts when they occur (Barton and
Hardigree 1995).
Fine tuning, elimination of ambiguity,
assimilating lore (tacit knowledge) from

experienced
members,
discovering
inconsistencies, building team cohesion,
upgrading the realism and plausibility of the
exercise are all important functions of the
system and the associated training exercises
(Nyblom, Reid, Coy and Walter 2003). The
formulation of a collective memory for dealing
with critical situations of any type will
ultimately be captured in the event templates,
the types of notifications, role responsibilities,
the content of the resource database and the
training scenarios. While some forms of tacit
knowledge are probably impossible to make
explicit (Hayek 1945), it is usually possible to
capture the consequences, e.g. decisions,
actions, of such knowledge (Belardo et al.
1984, Belardo and Harrald 1992; Bieber et al.
2002).
People with experience are important
sources of information. Our biggest problem
today is the way in which agencies within the
same organization resist the release and
sharing of information because prior mistakes
might embarrass the organization. What we
need to foster is the continuous collaborative
efforts of experienced people to be able to
communicate and exchange information even
when they are in different organizations.
Some of the most critical knowledge comes
from examining the mistakes that have been
made.
6.3 Online Communities of Experts
Given the situation that the USA now
faces and the fact that certain specialized
expertise might not be available in all
localities, the original idea of networking
experts from 1970 at OEP should be
revitalized. This was the basis for emergency
planning at OEP and the premise that lead to
the initial work on EMISARI (Linstone and
Turoff 1975; Turoff 1972, 2002). This system
integrated the large number of experts that
OEP had on tap to aid in crisis planning by
developing an online Delphi System. Today
with the Internet the idea of online
communities is well established and the
federal government should actually encourage
such communities, which, in return for being
provided the service, would commit to making
their expertise available to local communities
when a crisis occurs.
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There are examples today of informal
and formal communities of experts on the Web
(Table 3). Typically these are professionals
involved in local emergency response planning
and response efforts and they exchange some
very insightful and practical papers resulting
from their experiences.
This growing
literature is a treasure for developing improved
detailed requirements (Cameron, 2003).
Another important example is the way our
society handles the response to viruses on the
WWW. There are other groups in industry
that use one another to seek critical supplies
and resources needed to adjust to some peak in
demand. There are numerous collaborative
markets in such areas as rare and used books
where the professionals do in fact aid one
another when it is of mutual interest.
However, there is very little real design work
in creating collaborative systems to facilitate
such professional communities. Too many
people assume that primitive group
communications such as linear discussion lists
and email are all that is necessary and that is
what is used in most of the above examples.
The
use
of
a
tailored
structured
communication system as we have been
describing in this paper would be appropriate
as support systems for online communities in
the emergency response area.
Table 3. Professional Communities
International Association of Emergency
Managers
http://www.iaem.com/index.shtml
The international Emergency Management
Society
http://www.tiems.org/
Public Entity Risk Institute
http://www.riskinstitute.org/
Public Safety Wireless Network
http://www.pswn.gov/
Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials, International
http://www.apco911.org/
National Emergency Number Association
http://www.nena.org/
The American Civil Defense Association
http://www.tacda.org/
Techsoup: The technology place for non-profits
http://www.techsoup.org
Humanitarian Relief Community
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf
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The existence of communities of
experts who utilize the same system as would
be used in an emergency would minimize
much of the training that might be required for
the actual emergency. Furthermore in most
organizations,
whether
industry
or
government, there are always emergencies that
surface as sensemaking occasions (Weick
1995): shortages of resources, strikes, budget
overruns, bad publicity, disgruntled customers,
etc. A well designed emergency response
system
can
be
used
for
normal
communications
in
terms
of
basic
communication needs and the more specific
emergency response functions exercised in
terms of the more typical short term
organizational type crisis situations.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL
OBSERVATIONS
In the emergency response area it is
extremely fortunate that we do have a
metaphor of the “event log” that most
emergency response professionals are very
familiar with and which has analogies to the
actual way this would work in the computer.
In addition this metaphor provides what is
called "context visibility" where a great many
functions that the system must carry out can be
represented by direct links to the elements of
the metaphor. This will reduce greatly the
effort for the user to learn the system and at
the same time minimize the cognitive
overhead for carrying out these operations.
More importantly, the concept of events
and roles translates to non-crisis activities such
as meetings, plan development, committee
functions, project functions, and training
exercises. It is very easy to conceive of using
such a system between actual crises for all
planning and coordination to be carried out by
all the involved organizations and the liaisons
from those organizations.
The planning function is one that can
be well served by heterogeneous teams
utilizing this type of system. This includes
risk identification, risk assessment, crisis
planning and preparation, mobilization, and
recovery efforts (NyBlom, Reid, Coy, and
Walter 2003).
All these can lead to
improvements in the evolution of the system.
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Using the system on a day to day basis
for any sort of project activity, and even
allowing participating organizations to set up
internal copies for restricted use, ensures that
people will remain trained and able to respond
to a real crisis. In any case there are always, in
just about any organization, mini-crises which
usually result in special teams or committees
that have to work together to find a decent
resolution to the situation. Today it is likely
they are dispersed geographically and could
easily benefit from the type of system we have
been describing.
As a communication system it becomes
easy to incorporate an event generator driven
by clock time to turn the system into a
simulation gaming system to exercise a plan
for any type of crisis event consistent with the
current resource database and available
personnel (Van de Walle and Turoff 2001,
Van de Walle 2003). Those personnel from
other agencies not available for the exercise
can be simulated by the same sort of human
role event simulation. Being able to carry out
the exercise in real clock time adds to the
realism of the exercise (Turoff 1997) and the
resulting training outcome. A simulation is
realistic if it induces the same psychological
process in training that occurs in the crisis
(Sniezek, Wilkins, Wadlington, and Baumann
2002). This is also a good reason why a
training exercise should be a surprise to the
participants and not scheduled ahead for a
certain day and time as is often done. Prior
studies of role-event game simulations have
shown them to be one of the best mechanisms
of learning about a complex experience (Hsu
1989). To further heighten the psychological
process one should have crisis response teams
from different localities compete with one
another using the same game scenarios. This
could also lead to establishing “community of
practice” (Wenger and Snyder 2000) for
responders on a national bases.
These exercises should be used to allow
evaluation and evolution of the system
according to the feedback provided by the
users. If the users are used to making
improvements to the system as part of the
exercises, they are going to be more likely to
avoid the rigidity of response resulting from
the threat and its contributing stress factors
(Rice 1990; Staw, Sandelands and Dutton

1981). What one would like is a crisis
response system that stimulates creative
responses by the team members to a specific
unpredictable situation, e.g., strike, scandal,
environmental problem, proxy fight, non
performance on a contract, etc.
What we have defined as a system is a
Virtual Organization (Mowshowitz 1997,
2002) made up of a formal and informal
organizational workflow processes (Figure 1)
and a meta process (Figure 2) to regulate
structure.
In terms of the Mowshowitz (1997)
virtual organization structure, the uncontrolled
events
“crises/emergencies”
are
the
requirements and the resources are the
“satisficers.” The roles are the switching unit
that make the allocation of resources to
requirements and serve as management in
terms of collecting the information necessary
to perform the switching so as to meet the
objective of “mitigation of the crisis” and
maintain adequate resources for allocation.
Roles have both an informal mechanism to
allow individuals to assume needed roles and a
formal mechanism to assign roles that carry
authority (that may be delegated) and
oversight to ensure resources are used as well
as they can be. Taking the system that has
been proposed here and allowing it to operate
on all phases of the response process as a
virtual organization will provide the system
with the concept of “virtuality” (Turoff 1997)
which means the system itself will influence
change, and hopefully improvement, in the
response process as an evolutionary process.
In an excellent article by Bigley and
Roberts (2001), a series of interviews and
surveys of actual firefighting situations
resulted in a number of significant
observations on potential emergency response
organizational structures. A number of the
conclusions and observations of that article are
excellent, especially on the concept of roles,
the need for collective understandings, and the
need for delegation of authority. The result of
that paper is the proposal for an “Incident
Command System” (ICS) which is a highly
structured, top-down bureaucratic design with
certain elements of flexibility that allow
improvisation and authority delegation. It is
based upon verbal interaction and people who
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are located largely at the site of the emergency.
It presents an alternative in some ways to what
has been presented in this paper. In so doing it
highlights the need for further exploration of
emergency response structures.
The view of this article is that the ICS
approach would probably work well for a onedimensional emergency, e.g., a firefighting
situation where everyone has a high degree of
training and the response group is homogenous
in nature. It is not likely to accommodate a

multidimensional crisis situation as the verbal
mediation necessary for improvisation and
flexibility will fall apart from information
overload and the heterogeneous nature of all
the individual agencies involved. If we have
learned anything about the design of computer
based systems and especially communications,
it is that automating the common practice from
the physical world often does not perform in a
manner to make optimal use of the technology.

Mitigation

Uncontrolled
Events

Controlled
Events

Resource
Allocation

Reporting

ROLES
Resource
Acquisition
Logs
Notifications
Databases

Figure 1: Workflow Communication Process

Formal

Informal
People

Assign

Assume

ROLE

Responsibility
Accountability

Authority
Oversight

Figure 2: Meta Communication Process
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Perhaps the most worrisome concern is
the “threat-rigidity” hypothesis developed by
Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) and
further discussed by Rice (1990). Individuals
undergoing stress, anxiety and psychological
arousal tend to increase their reliance on
internal hypothesis and focus on dominant
cues to emit well-learned responses. In simple
terms, the potential response to a crisis
situation is to go by the book and use only
learned responses. However, if the response
situation does not fit the original training the
resulting performance may be completely
wrong. One needs to ensure that people are
encouraged to think about the situation and
examine their potential actions to allow some
degree of improvising or creativity.
The communication and organizational
structure and the flow of information are going
to be very critical with respect to whether it
encourages or inhibits rigidity. It is our view
that a flat organizational structure, one that
allows equal participation with respect to
access to whatever information they feel they
may need to consider, will encourage
flexibility of response. In most organizational
structures negative information gets more
positive as it moves up the chain of command.
Flatter organizations with respect to the
movement of information tend to reduce this
problem especially when the source of report
is digital and available to all that are involved
at any level. This also has an impact on the
attitude of the responders who should feel they
are part of a cohesive group of peers all
equally striving to do their best to mitigate the
crisis. The attitude of those responding to the
crisis and the cohesive nature of the teams
involved is critical to the success of the effort
(Braverman 2003; King 2002). At least one
experimental study investigating the nature of
organizational response to a crisis showed that
friendships and trust that cuts across the
organizational units allow teams of crisis
responders to be more effective (Krackhardt
and Stern 1988). When we talk about a major
crisis event we are talking about people across
different organizations and agencies becoming
a team. This also speaks to the need for
regular interaction between the responders and
the formation and facilitation of an on going
community.

A recent survey (Horseley and Barker
2002) of state government responses in various
crises found that the most successful form of
communications for dealing with events
between various government units was
interagency e-mail. Communications between
different agencies by people who have not
worked together probably contains a lot of
ambiguity. The result of ambiguity is that
people often think they communicated and
agreed when in fact they did not. When asked
they would, of course, think the
communication went well.
This is the
common “ambiguity of consensus” that occurs
in group meetings, where everyone is later
surprised at what they are reported to have
agreed to. Clearly the use of group-oriented
communication systems dealing with text
would have been an even better technology for
this task.
It seems that every careful study of
local emergency response even for nonextreme events such as tornados shows that
coordination is a major problem across
different involved agencies and that many
officials or professionals in these agencies do
not remember or are not familiar with the
emergency procedures (McEntire 2001;
Parker, LeDuc and Lynn 2002).
The
coordination problem is the key hidden
problem in emergency response that has been
largely ignored. Physical reorganization of
agencies has never been a solution to the
coordination problem.
Providing the
technology to allow people to form groups
dynamically around a crisis is the approach
that will address the coordination problem.
With computers in the loop it is now
possible to have a number of professionals at
different levels observing and reviewing what
is taking place so that oversight can work to a
much greater degree than in the verbal
environment with hierarchical levels of
command. Carrying with it the property of
accountability also makes people much more
likely to give a reasonable degree of
consideration to any decision they make. Too
often in the verbal environment, who made the
decision
is
sometimes
ambiguous.
Furthermore, in the standard database
approach the identity of the contributor and the
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rationale for the content are immediately lost.
This lack of accountability in traditional
information systems and the problems it
produces for organizations has been
recognized for a long time (Zmud 1979).
The underlying model we have
proposed for DERMIS would allow the
introduction of a continuous audit process
(Alles, Kogan, and Vasarhelyi 2003). The
function of this would be to track and
determine if the available information, relevant
to a particular problem, has been distributed to
all those that need to be involved in the
resolution of that problem at that point in time.
Such an extension of the design would provide
a high degree of assurance for the carrying out
of the roles associated with the functions of
delegation of authority, accountability,
responsibility, and oversight. It would also
allow the efficient design of automated agents
that could track and alert individuals to when
they need to update themselves about a given
problem situation.
At this point in time too little attention
is being paid to understanding and designing
the command and control system for crisis
events for local and regional areas. Current

advice on planning still focuses on having an
emergency response center and back up center
(NyBlom, Reid, Coy and Walter 2003). The
concept of being able to have a fully dispersed
system is still non-existent and the cost of such
physical centers can be prohibitive for many
small communities.
However the military and large
corporations such as Bank of America and
Wells Fargo are investigating virtual command
and control systems as well as virtual
emergency operations centers (Davis 2002;
Roos 2002).
The virtual nature of
communication has the potential to provide
decision makers, at different levels, with a
crisis situation visualization in a virtual reality
space. The virtual command center can also
function from workstations at different
geographical
locations
using
Internet
technology.
In Chinese the word for crisis is made
up of two symbols: danger and opportunity
(Kim 1998). There is an opportunity to
improve dramatically the design and
functionality of Emergency Response Systems
and considerable danger to be faced if we do
not!
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